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ABSTRACT
The power grid is facing increasing risks from a cybersecurity attack. Attacks that shut
off electricity in Ukraine have already occurred, and successful compromises of the power grid
that did not shut off electricity to customers have been privately disclosed in North America. The
objective of this study is to identify how perceptions of various factors emphasized in the electric
sector affect incident response planning. Methods used include a survey of 229 power grid
personnel and the use of partial least squares structural equation modeling to identify causal
relationships. This study reveals the relationships between perceptions by personnel responsible
for cybersecurity, regarding incident response exercises, information sharing, and situational
awareness, and incident response planning. The results confirm that the efforts by the industry
on these topics have advanced planning for a potential attack.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background

As demonstrated by recent attacks, the electric sector faces an increasing risk of
disruption of services to end customers. As electricity is a core critical infrastructure for modern
society, this risk goes beyond just the businesses and threatens the general public. The industry
has set requirements to manage an incident successfully and to prepare for attacks against the
bulk electric system (NERC, 2019c). Not only does the industry recognize the importance of
this preparation, but North American governments recognize this need. Further, books such as
Lights Out: A Cyberattack, A Nation Unprepared, Surviving the Aftermath (Koppel, 2015) raised
awareness across the general public.
Addressing the threat of a massive cybersecurity incident in the power grid is complex.
As of 2015, there are about 16,000 transmission substations, 7,098 high voltage transmission
lines, and 1,057 gigawatts of generation serving 334 million customers in the interconnected
power systems that make up the North American power grid. This grid includes the mainland
U.S., portions of Canada, and portions of Baja California in Mexico (NERC, 2016c). These
totals do not include local distribution power lines and substations.
No cybersecurity attacks since 2014 have resulted in a loss of power supply (loss of load)
to any customer in the North American power grid (NERC, 2016f, 2019d). However,
cyberattacks that resulted in loss of load occurred on two occasions in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016
(Assante, Conway, Lee, & E-ISAC, 2016; Assante, Conway, Lee, & E-ISAC, 2017). Further,
1

there are reports that the Russian hacking group, variously identified as Dragonfly or Energetic
Bear, has obtained access within the power grid to the point they could have thrown the switches
(Smith, 2018).
A successful large scale cyberattack could have an impact similar to the 2003 Northeast
Blackout, which lasted four days and cost the economy between $4 billion and $10 billion
(Knake, 2017). With a widespread interconnected power grid controlled by thousands of
companies (NERC, 2019b), the attack surface is too widespread to prevent every cyberattack.
While most cybersecurity incidents are likely to be much smaller, the ability to respond to and
recover from a cybersecurity incident is mandatory.

1.2 Problem Statement

The electric sector has focused on a variety of issues related to cybersecurity incident
response, primarily through the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). The
NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC) has focused on various issues
including information sharing and situational awareness (Diebold et al., 2013; E-ISAC, 2018),
mandatory incident response planning (NERC, 2019c), and large scale incident response
exercises (NERC, 2012, 2014, 2016d, 2018a). Each of these components involves people who
are receiving information, placing the information in context, and practicing incident response
skills. Incident response is dependent on each of these skills to manage an incident. There is a
clear need in the electric sector to understand how individuals perceive these topics and fit them
together in preparation for a cybersecurity incident.
2

1.3 Research Goal and Objectives

The main objective of this study is to develop a model that can explain the causal
relationship between incident response exercise learning, information sharing quality, situational
awareness confidence, and adequacy of incident response plans by personnel in power grid
utilities.

3

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The power grid consists of three major domains: generation, transmission, and local
distribution. Each of these domains uses operational technologies (OT) and industrial control
systems. For example, supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) are
commonly used to open and close breakers that control the flow of power. Generation plants use
the same types of control systems that are used broadly in manufacturing.
Planning is necessary before responding to an incident. These plans also require
appropriate testing before use. The industry routinely develops plans for many types of events.
In the 2008 to 2015 time period, nine of the ten most stressed days for the power grid we a result
of weather (NERC, 2016f). Not only do common large-scale incidents such as weather have
carefully prepared plans, cybersecurity incident response planning is regulatory mandated across
the bulk power systems (NERC, 2019c). Further, these incident response plans are tested
annually for critical portions of the power grid and once every three years for the remainder of
the bulk electric system. A large portion of the industry participates in a biennial continental
exercise simulating a broad cyber and physical attack against the bulk electric system (NERC,
2012, 2014, 2016d).
Situational awareness weaknesses are not new to the electric sector. The Northeast
Blackout of 2003 included poor situational awareness and blindness to critical information as
root causes (US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004). To maintain shared
situational awareness across the industry, NERC operates the Electricity Information Sharing and
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Analysis Center (E-ISAC) for the sharing of information in support of situational awareness (EISAC, 2018).

2.1 Cyberattacks in the Electric and Energy Sectors

Cyberattacks have been rare in the electric sector, with only two known attacks occurring
in Ukraine that directly disrupted electrical services to customers, also referred to as loss of load.
However, there have been attacks elsewhere in the energy sector and in other industrial sectors
that use similar systems.
An early incident occurred in 2003 when the SQL Slammer worm infected the safety
system at the Davis-Besse Nuclear power plant. The worm passed from a contractor’s network
through the business network at the plant and into the plant control systems network, where it
crashed safety monitoring systems. The power plant was offline at the time of the attack (Nicol,
2011). Unlike many of the later attacks, this was a side effect of a poorly protected system and a
random internet worm.
The first widely known attack was the famous Stuxnet attack discovered in 2010 that was
performed by the U.S. and Israel against the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz. The
attack was performed by a contractor that supported the air-gapped Siemens control system used
at the facility. The system went beyond basic protections by air-gapping the entire control
system from the internet and other internal connections (Zetter & 3M Company, 2014).

5

A 2014 report discussed a German steel mill that sustained massive damage, killed two
persons, and injured 13 others. The attack is the first known example after the Stuxnet attack
against a control system that caused physical damage. The attack methodology included
phishing of employees to gain entry, compromising a host on the corporate network, moved into
the control system network, and then performance of the damaging attack (Lee, Assante, &
Conway, 2014). Private discussions indicate that there have been other similar unpublished
attacks. Each of these attacks follows the ideas adapted from the military in 2011, known as the
Lockheed Martin® Cyber Kill Chain (Assante & Lee, 2015; Lockheed Martin, 2015). The
motivations for these attacks are unknown.
Two successful attacks in 2015 and 2016 against the Ukraine power grid resulted in loss
of electrical service to customers, the only known times that cyberattacks have disrupted
electrical service. In 2015, approximately 225,000 customers lost power and as a result of a
carefully targeted cyberattack against three power distribution companies in Ukraine. The attack
path followed the cyber kill chain and partially made use of the BlackEnergy2 tool that was
specifically targeting a control system. Additional supporting techniques enhanced the
effectiveness of the attack including electronically destroying (“bricking”) communications
equipment to the attacked substations, attacks that took control of UPS in the control centers,
denial of service attacks against the phone systems, and formatting the hard drives inside the
control systems (Assante et al., 2016; Department of Homeland Security - CISA, 2016; Zetter,
2016). Private conversations with members of the investigation team that visited the Ukraine
indicate that other industrial sectors had been prepared for an attack, but the attack was not
executed. Later analysis by Dragos® indicates the attack had intentions of causing more
6

prolonged outages, but an attack against the relays that would have allowed the destruction of
breakers when re-energizing the equipment failed (Greenberg, 2019). The 2016 attack took
some of the ideas from 2015 and automated the attack by building a framework to carry out
those attacks using a tool that has been dubbed CrashOverride by Dragos® and Industroyer by
ESET®. This attack power disrupted generation in the capital region in Ukraine and disrupted
200 megawatts of transmission (Assante et al., 2017; Cherepanov & Lipovsky, 2017;
Department of Homeland Security - CISA, 2017a; Dragos, 2017) .
In 2017, attacks continued against the energy sector, the electric sector, and nuclear
power, in the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign using the Havex malware. The attack followed the above
kill chain. (Symantec, 2017; Venkatachary, Prasad, & Samikannu, 2018). No destructive attacks
occurred as a result of this campaign. In 2018 the Department of Homeland Security CISA team
released an alert and briefed the industry in a set of non-public calls that the attackers had direct
access to the control systems(Department of Homeland Security - CISA, 2018). However, that
view was challenged by industry leaders during a meeting with Secretary of Homeland Security
Nielsen and the Secretary of Energy Perry, where they stated the intrusion was limited to one or
two wind turbine sites (Sobczak, 2018). That meeting also included information that the attack
was discovered by the Department of Energy’s Cyber Risk Information Sharing Program
(CRISP), which includes a set of sensors that monitors internet traffic into many of the large
power companies (Department of Energy, 2018).
While any attack against a control system can be dangerous, attacks are now targeting
safety systems inside of production facilities. The Trisis attack (a.k.a. Tricon, Hatman) against
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the Schneider Triconex® safety instrumentation system disrupted a Saudi Arabian petrochemical
facility. This type of attack can be used to place a targeted facility in an unsafe condition and
potentially threaten the general public (Department of Homeland Security - CISA, 2017b).
While public impact has so far been minimal, capabilities have advanced from random
events, through Stuxnet as the first highly targeted control system attack, continuing through
BlackEnergy 2 used maliciously against the power grid, further advancing to CrashOverride
automating the attack, and then finally the Trisis attacking emergency shutdowns for safety
systems. Whether the motivation is criminal profit, hacktivism to make a statement, or by
countries to gain a political or military advantage, the attacks will become more capable. An
extended power outage may be the desired outcome or just the side effect. Either way, when
protection fails, the ability to effectively respond to a cyberattack is mandatory.

2.2 Electricity Sector Cybersecurity Regulatory Requirements

While distribution is locally regulated, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) regulates the bulk power system. However, the responsibility for developing the
regulations is assigned to, and enforcement is shared with the industry through the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) under section 215 of the Federal Power Act.
NERC grew up as an industry organization following the 1967 blackout that affected the
northeast United States and eastern Canada (NERC, 2016e) and continues to play multiple roles
as an enforcement body, developer of regulatory standards for the reliability and security of the
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power grid, and as the reliability coordinator for the industry. All bulk generation and
transmission owners are mandated to become a member of NERC by the Federal Power Act.
Bulk power system transmission substations, generation stations, and control centers are
required to have and test a documented incident response plan. Standard CIP-008-5 for high and
medium impact systems or CIP-003-6 for low impact assets mandates incident response plans
(NERC, 2019c). These rules have been approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission in Orders 791and 822. (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2013, 2016).
Canada generally adopts NERC standards and enforces these standards on a provincial basis
(NERC, 2017). Additional requirements are continually in development.

2.3 Cybersecurity Incident Response Planning

Both power grid operators and the information technology industry have developed
strong incident management skills. The power grid developed these skills because of significant
natural events such as earthquakes, ice storms, hurricanes, and various power grid cascading
failures. The computer security profession has formalized incident response standards.

2.3.1 Managing Events: Risk vs. Resilience

When considering cyberattacks, risk and resilience have slightly different meanings.
Both are relevant to having an incident response process. Risk is defined by the likelihood and
impact of an attack, whereas resiliency refers to the ability to continue operating during an attack
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and return to the normal state following the attack (National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2012). Based on these definitions, risk assessment is performed to ensure the
proper protections are in place before an attack occurs. Resilience needs to be designed into the
system to ensure that it can continue operating.
Risk assessment in the electric sector is mandated in the Reliability Standards for the
Bulk Electric System of North America in standard CIP-002-5.1 (NERC, 2019c). The analysis
performed here defines minimum cybersecurity requirements for the power grid based on this
risk. However, this standard only considers the impact on simplifying the analysis process.
While standardized to define the needed protections, this view of risk reflects neither the
evolving infrastructure used in power grid control systems nor the evolving capabilities of the
attacker.
Cybersecurity resilience also receives significant attention in the electric sector. For
example, both the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee’s studies by the Cyber
Attack Task Force and the Severe Impact Resilience Task Force considers resilience. As the
North American power grid has a long history of dealing with “normal” emergencies such as
weather events, resilience is not a new concept. However, following a severe event that causes
massive damage, a “new normal” with degraded planning and operating conditions will be
established that could last for months or years. In response to these events, operational
parameters such as islanding portions of the power grid, changes to system operating parameters
and protections systems, and degradation of communications may occur. The Cyber Attack Task
Force focused on a prevent, detect, respond, recover model. The Severe Impact Resilience Task
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Force focused on preparing the operational components for a severe event such as an attack or
geomagnetic disturbance. This team considered topics such as system operations, monitoring
communications, and planning during a major event (Abell et al., 2012; Bowe et al., 2012).

2.3.2 Cybersecurity Incident Response Handling

Cybersecurity incident response handling is a mature field from a process perspective.
While the specific attacks and associated responses vary widely, the overall approach is well
understood. NIST SP 800-61 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide defines a computer
security incident as “a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies,
acceptable use policies, or standard security practices” (Cichonski, Millar, Grance, & Scarfone,
2012).
Numerous incident response planning guides have been published (Tøndel, Line, &
Jaatun, 2014). In addition to NIST SP 800-61 published in the U.S. (Cichonski et al., 2012),
The European Network and Information Security Agency publishes Good Practice Guide for
Incident Management (Maj, Reijers, & Stikvoort, 2010). ISO/IEC 27035 is also a widely used
international standard (International Organization for Standardization [ISO], 2016). Numerous
other organizations, such as SANS (Kral, 2011), publish guidance. While there are definite
differences in the details of these guides, they all emphasize the same concepts.
Incident response guidelines that focus on information technology and industrial control
systems are of specific interest for the power grid. NIST defines industrial control systems (ICS)
as:
11

Industrial control system (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types
of control systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other control system
configurations such as skid-mounted Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC)
often found in the industrial sectors and critical infrastructures. (Stouffer,
Pillitteri, Lightman, Abrams, & Hahn, 2015)
Industrial control systems (ICS) operate in a real-time environment, such as the power
grid. As ICS controls physical equipment, incidents may not only result in production and
service interruptions but present a risk to humans and the environment. Further, physical attacks
on this equipment often can have a considerable impact. While the implementation of parts of
the plan is different, the overall flow of incident response remains similar.
Table 1 identifies the overall process flows for several conventional processes and the
NERC defined process. It highlights the similarities and differences between processes.
Table 1 Comparison of Cybersecurity Incident Response Handling Programs

ISO 27035
1. Plan and prepare
2. Detection and
reporting
3. Assessment and
decision
4. Responses

5. Lessons learned

NIST
SP 800-61
1. Preparation
2. Detection and
Analysis

3. Containment,
Eradication, and
Recovery
4. Post-Incident
Activity

ENISA
1. Detection
2. Triage
3. Analysis
4. Response
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NERC
Workshop
1. Preparation
2. Identification

3. Containment
4. Eradication
5. Recovery
6. Lessons Learned

NIST has identified an overall cybersecurity framework for critical infrastructure
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2018). This framework identifies five
functions that assist in preventing and responding to an attack with specific functions within each
category and subcategories that identify the details of the model. While the identify, protect, and
detect processes occur continuously, actual events trigger response and recovery. In the industry,
the phrase “stay left of boom” focuses on prevention, while being prepared to deal with boom
once it occurs.

Adapted from NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

Figure 1 Preventing and Managing an Attack

2.3.3 Incident Response Handling Structure

While a small event can often be quickly handled using these approaches, a larger scale
event requires a generalized incident response protocol. Both physical and electronic damage
may be present and impact the public.
The U.S. Government, under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has
developed an incident response standard widely used by first responders in many other types of
13

events. This process is known as the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Due to the
close tie between the electricity sector and various North American federal and state government
agencies, an understanding of this program provides a planning approach (Department of
Homeland Security, 2008).
The NIMS core process document includes specific information on the communication of
information between different parties within the team. NIMS refers to a common operating
picture that “is established and maintained by gathering, collating, synthesizing, and
disseminating incident information to all appropriate parties.” This understanding allows an
understanding of available resources, requests, and priorities. The communications
infrastructure focuses on interoperability, reliability, scalability, and resiliency.
A standardized format for information sharing ensures situational awareness.
Maintaining communication begins with incident notification and continues through status
reports in an easy to analyze format. Further, tracking this information allows a stronger afteraction review. Of course, not everything will easily fit into the standard reporting format, and
information will need to be available in the best manner to present the information. Clarity is
more important than perfection when reporting and using information. Timely information is
often more critical than complete information. The last little bit of perfection adds little to the
decision-makers' ability to decide. Finally, the exchange of information needs to be
appropriately secured. Through this, NIMS demonstrates a preplanned incident response system
that reduces the complexity and time when responding to an event.

14

Incident Command

Operations
Section Chief

Public Information
Officer

Planning
Section Chief

Safety
Officer

Logistics
Section Chief

Liaison

Finance & Administration
Section Chief

General Staff

Command Staff

Adapted from DHS FEMA National Incident Management System 2008

Figure 2 NIMS Incident Command Structure (Department of Homeland Security, 2008)

2.3.4 Cybersecurity Incident Response Team Effectiveness

Incident response is dependent on the integrated skills and capability of the cybersecurity
incident response team. The Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute summarizes
several factors that affect response in the closing remarks of their Handbook for Computer
Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs). As is true for security in general, the needs of
each CSIRT are unique, and the CSIRT environment is dynamic. There is no chance of longterm stability, since technology, the constituency base, and the intruder community can change
15

any time. To ensure successful operation, a CSIRT must have the ability to adapt to the changing
needs of the environment and exhibit the flexibility to deal with the unexpected. In addition, a
CSIRT must simultaneously address funding issues and organizational changes that can affect its
ability to either adapt to the needs or provide the service itself. (West-Brown, Stikvoort,
Kossakowski, Killcrece, & Ruefle, 2003)

2.3.5 An Incident Response Case Study: Gulf Oil Spill

These ideas are not unique to the electric sector. A real-world case study of an event in
the Gulf of Mexico documents the practical implementation of incident response in the physical
world. This document highlights the response in terms of strategy, tactics, and operational
processes. The strategic level identifies the goals and determines the overall actions, which are
set by the incident manager and supporting team. During the incident, the planning team
identified the specific activities to be taken with adequate detail to carry the plan out. The
operational team then carries out this plan.
Limited or inadequate information challenges response teams early in the process. Often,
the first part of the process focuses on the tactical viewpoint and may be performed based on preplanning and rule-based analysis. Typically, time and risk factors are most critical early in the
process. Changing conditions will typically be seen, requiring personnel to adapt to the
environment rapidly. As the process continues, the strategic actions gain importance (Crichton,
Lauche, & Flin, 2005).

16

As demonstrated in this case study, there are three levels of decisions needed during a
security event. Decisions occur at the real-time or operational level, the tactical level, and at a
strategic level.

2.3.6 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain

Managing the attack requires a detailed understanding of the events to see how the attack
occurs. A cyber kill chain, commercially developed by Lockheed Martin (Lockheed Martin,
2015), evaluates the processes an attacker uses to break in and cause damage. Assante and Lee
(2015) extend this approach to industrial control systems. Based on private discussions with
members of E-ISAC and others in the industry, many in the electric sector have adopted this
approach.
There are two stages to this kill chain. Intrusion into the network occurs in the first stage.
Developing and performing the attack on control system equipment occurs during the second
stage. Cyber kill chain theory posits that the attack disruption may occur at any point in the kill
chain. Figure 3 shows the individual steps typically used by the adversary. The highlighted
steps are observable by the defender and present an opportunity to disrupt the attack. The further
into the attack, the more difficult it is for the attacker to proceed without detection. The Stuxnet
attacks on Iranian centrifuges highlights the attacker's approach.
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Figure 3 ICS Cyber Kill Chain (Assante & Lee, 2015)
The December 2015 Ukraine cyberattack also followed this approach (Assante et al.,
2016). While the approach is straightforward, it effectively identifies opportunities to disrupt the
attacks.

2.4 Situational Awareness

Early situational awareness research evolved from military and aircraft operations, with
Mica Endsley widely published and cited in this research. She defines situational awareness as:
Situation Awareness is the perception of the elements in the environment within a
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection
of their status in the near future (Endsley, 1995).
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2.4.1 Importance of Situational Awareness in the Bulk Power System

After the 2003 U.S. and Canada blackout affecting 50 million people and 61,800 MW of
electric load, the U.S. and Canadian Task Force identified three groups of causes for the blackout
directly related to situational awareness including (US-Canada Power System Outage Task
Force, 2004):
•

•
•

“FirstEnergy and ECAR failed to assess and understand the inadequacies of FE’s
system, particularly with respect to voltage instability and the vulnerability of
the Cleveland-Akron area, and FE did not operate its system with appropriate
voltage criteria.”
“Inadequate situational awareness at FirstEnergy. FE did not recognize or
understand the deteriorating condition of its system.”
“Failure of the interconnected grid’s reliability organizations to provide effective
real-time diagnostic support.”

Since this report, the industry has focused on real-time situational awareness and understanding
within power grid operations.

2.4.2 Situational Awareness Overview

Endsley, in 2012 and 2013, presented an overview of situational awareness in the bulk
power system at the NERC Human Performance Conference in 2012 and expanded the idea in a
related journal article (Connors, Endsley, & Jones, 2007; Endsley, 2012). In the overview,
Endsley highlighted the relationship between awareness and understanding in terms of
perception of the current state, comprehension of this state, and projection of the potential future
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state. Figure 4 places this in terms of “what,” “so what,” and “now what.” Situational awareness
provides the information for decision-making in the environment using this approach.

Situational Awareness
What Do I Need?

What Does it Mean?

What Will Happen?

Perception

Comprehension

Projection

What

So What

Now What

Adapted from M. Endsley, SA Technologies, 2012

Figure 4 Situational Awareness (Endsley, 2012)
While the approach currently focuses on real-time decision-making concerning power
grid operations, it also provides a useful basis for power grid cybersecurity. Perception begins
with the detection of something interesting happening on the network. Once the information
becomes available, possibly through automated alerts or an analyst’s recognition of events,
additional information allows the formation of a mental model of the event. Perception then
evolves into comprehension of the current state of the event. Once attaining comprehension,
analysts can finally project potential impacts (D'Amico, Whitley, Tesone, O'Brien, & Roth,
2005).
When the analyst has the right information for situational awareness, the analyst has the
tools to utilize the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) model (Blasch et al., 2009). This
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approach combines both real-time and tactical information for the commander of an incident to
make intuitive decisions under stress. Steps int OODA model includes:
•
•
•
•

Observe the current incident and understand the threat
Orient to the threat and understand alternatives and project the impact of various
alternatives
Decide among the options to select a response based on available information
Act on the decision while continuing to make new observations

In addition to real-time situational awareness, tactical situational understanding also
provides value when evaluating alternatives and opportunities. In essence, real-time situational
awareness focuses on the immediate here and now. Tactical situational understanding orients the
decision-maker to assess the environment and mission requirements.
One study identified six recommendations for incident command system design (Bigley &
Roberts, 2001). Of specific interest is the recommendation “Institute protocols for mental model
development and maintenance.” The authors suggest several questions that can be adapted to
cybersecurity events to obtain this shared mental model.
•
•
•
•

“How much attention should be directed to situational comprehension?”
“When and how should individuals initiate mental model development?”
“What communication protocols would insure (sic) effective dissemination of
information critical to mental models?”
“How can representational responsibility be off-loaded?”

Another study in an information security focused article identified three deficiencies in
situational awareness of risk information in their literature review (Webb, Ahmad, Maynard, &
Shanks, 2014). First, risk identification is treated in a perfunctory manner. The authors propose
that a lack of risk management training by professionals performing the risk assessment process
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results in a non-consideration of information sources. They also propose that this review is
treated more as a compliance requirement rather than using a granulated assessment. Next, they
highlight that the risk assessment does not consider the organization’s situation, but instead
reflects the assessor’s speculation rather than the evidence. Further, the assessment is often
rendered as subjective numerical probability and risk values that do not consider the specific
environment. Finally, the authors find that information is gathered on an intermittent basis rather
than on a scheduled basis. As a result, the ability to analyze changes is limited.

2.4.3 Shared Situational Awareness

While the incident response commander leads the response, all participants need the
appropriate information to make decisions consistent with the response. Essentially, there needs
to be shared situational understanding around the event and the decisions made. After creating a
shared understanding, the individual may apply this information to their situational awareness for
their immediate responsibilities. Further, each individual’s observations also need to be shared.
While obtaining shared situational awareness is critical, the challenges are far more
significant for dispersed teams. Kaber and Endsley (1998), while reviewing shared situational
awareness in process control systems, identified several barriers to achieving this awareness.
Unavailable or low-quality information being collected and shared often results in weak
situational awareness. Further, information that would be valuable to other teams may not be
shared. The organizational culture and the capability to effectively share information are core to
allowing this communication to happen. Organizational instability impairs this organizational
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culture. Interpersonal conflicts, especially when the leader or another team member takes a
dictatorial approach, impairs communication, and could result in decisions made for
organizational cohesiveness rather than effectiveness. The lack of a shared environment and
supporting non-verbal communications in dispersed teams adds complexity to developing a
consistent operating picture.
One significant advantage the electric sector has is that E-ISAC operates as a central
service for maintaining situational awareness. While the large investor-owned utilities may have
the resources to assign resources to monitor the risk environment, smaller entities such as the
municipal utilities and cooperatives do not have the same resources available. A centralized
approach may be an appropriate approach as long as the collective situational awareness is
shared.

2.5 Information Sharing

The ability to perform analysis is highly dependent on both the real-time information
collected for both power grid operations and on the overall tactical cybersecurity status.

2.5.1 Information Sharing and Shared Situational Awareness

One study of command and control in a battlefield exercise identified that successful
information sharing between command and control staff, each with their specific areas of
expertise, permitted proactive actions during the battlefield exercise. Three types of individual
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information support information sharing: current work goal and situation, work process, and
specialized domain knowledge. The work process is related to the specific task procedures and
informal practices. The handoffs not only occur between teams but within teams during shift
changes (Sonnenwald & Pierce, 2000).
One of the challenges to obtaining shared situational awareness is sharing not just the
right information, but the right amount of information to obtain a common operating picture.
Information needs change as an incident evolves. Timeliness, accuracy, and quality of the
information evolves during the situation. The real value is not the data, but the interpretation of
the data (Harrald & Jefferson, 2007).
Information sharing between teams would seem simple using modern tools. However,
each individual has an individual goal to obtain. People will often share information in a manner
that helps them obtain their goal rather than the overall goal. As individuals determine personal
goals, the results can be significantly changed by the planning and organizational structure that
either rewards a positive information-sharing context or builds barriers to effective information
sharing (Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004).

2.5.2 Information Sources

The Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) manages overall
cybersecurity for the electricity sector. E-ISAC is a NERC organization that coordinates with
utilities and government agencies to collect and share security information and coordinates
incident management across the sector (Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center,
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2016a). Overall, there are 21 Information Sharing and Analysis Centers for critical infrastructure
that provide and collect information on cyber and physical security hazards (National Council of
ISACs, 2016).
E-ISAC provides a private portal with daily reports, industry discussions, and a private
monthly web conference. These non-public briefings typically include current event information
from E-ISAC analysts, DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and ICS-CERT on current
events. Finally, events include the annual GridSecCon Power Grid Security Conference and
quarterly updates provided to the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee. For the
program to be successful, organizations need to share information with E-ISAC (Electricity
Information Sharing and Analysis Center, 2016b). This information should also be shared with
other appropriate resources.
In addition to E-ISAC, there are numerous other information sources with many
organized in coordination with the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. Much of this information is general information security, though DHS
maintains a specific Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT).
While information is often available, it comes from a wide variety of sources and takes
significant work to coordinate.
While the above techniques handle the vast majority of cyber and physical security
information, critical information is occasionally escalated to the NERC alert level. There are
three levels of formal NERC alerts shown in Table 2 below (NERC, 2016a, 2016b). The highest
level of alert, an essential action, has never been used.
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Table 2 NERC Alerts
Alert Type

Description

Alerts issued
since 2014
10

Industry Advisory

“Purely informational, intended to alert registered entities to issues or
potential problems. A response to NERC is not necessary.”

Industry
Recommendation

“Recommends specific action be taken by registered entities. A
response from recipients, as defined in the alert, is required.”

5

Essential Action

“Identifies actions deemed to be “essential” to bulk power system
reliability and requires NERC Board of Trustees' approval prior to
issuance. Like recommendations, essential actions also require
recipients to respond as defined in the alert.”

0

2.5.3 Information Sharing Complexities in the Electric Sector

The NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee produced a report entitled
Recommendations for Improved Information Sharing that highlights the complexity of
communications and the number of resources available (Diebold et al., 2013). The team
highlighted seven agencies, 11 separate sources of documents, and nine sets of recipients that
either request or require communication to occur.
The amount of complexity involved stresses the processes and requires significant
planning during an incident to ensure information is shared with the right agencies and
organizations. The report highlights the challenges in the following quote:
The industry struggles to make correlations between information received from
various information sources… Due to various requirements, industry must report
the same or similar information to sources listed above. Having so many reporting
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and information sources results in duplicative information, and important
information can be overlooked. The industry needs a central hub for reporting
suspicious physical and cyber-related events. Consolidated reporting will greatly
enhance the analysis and detection of emerging threats. (Diebold et al., 2013)
This report also identifies a sample of current information sources that need to be
monitored and correlated, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

NERC Standards Announcements
NERC Alerts
NERC Standards Interpretation Requests
DHS For Official Use Only
DOE Sector-Specific Agency Information
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) Alerts
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) Alerts
E-ISAC Notices
Vendor Notices
National Lab Research
2.5.4 Information Sharing Metrics

From the above research, information sharing and situational awareness are closely
related. Effective information sharing supports good situational awareness, both before and
during an event. As demonstrated in the industry’s communication processes, information can
be shared widely and rapidly across multiple groups and requires using many processes.
One component of the incident response plan is preparation. This information sharing
identifies current risks and potential issues. The U.S. Department of Energy Sandia National
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Lab has developed a threat model focused on energy (Mateski et al., 2012). This model focuses
on the threat and the attackers. It evaluates threats across two major category groups,
commitment, and resources. These groups are broken down into subcomponents:
•

•

Commitment
o Intensity – Diligence and perseverance to reach a goal
o Stealth – higher secrecy reduces the defender’s countermeasures
o Time – More time spent on an attack increases potential devastation
Resources
o Technical Personnel – Number of skilled personnel increases capability
o Knowledge – Higher specialized knowledge increases capability
o Access – Infiltration of systems whether technical, insider, or coercion
2.6 Exercising the Incident Response Plan: NERC GridEx

Bulk electric system utilities are required to exercise their incident response plan annually
for many facilities and at least once every three years for every facility (NERC, 2019c). From
private discussions, most organizations use a standard cybersecurity incident response plan for
all of their applicable facilities. When performing these exercises, each utility is required to
follow their plan and identify deviations taken from the plan, identify lessons learned from the
exercise, and develop and implement plans to address the lessons learned.
NERC has recognized that to respond to a cybersecurity event effectively, and companies
must practice for the event. In addition to exercises run by individual utilities, NERC has
performed four large-scale national exercises biennially, known as GridEx or the Grid Security
Exercise. November 2019 marks the fifth incarnation of GridEx.
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The initial exercise included 64 utilities, Reliability Coordinators, and Regional Entities
in 2011, along with 19 government representatives. Participation has grown massively. In 2017
during GridEx IV, participation grew to include 238 power grid participants and 202 federal,
state, and provincial teams (NERC, 2018a). In addition to utility participation, an executive
tabletop exercise is held that includes utility CEOs and U.S. agencies, including the White House
National Security Council, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Defense, and National Security Agency.
GridEx III in 2015 simulated a continent-wide coordinated cybersecurity and physical
security attacks with national scenario development performed by E-ISAC and CIPC with
regional planning and exercise response managed by Reliability Coordinators. The incidents start
slowly and build until the maximum effect is reached at the end of exercise day one, followed by
recovery to sustainable operations on day two. Having led teams that included developing the
scenarios, I have observed that the objective is to maximize learning capability using a set of
reasonable events that includes considering historical events. The exercise scope excludes highimpact low-frequency events such as electromagnetic pulse and military attacks. Further, it is a
simulation and does not involve shutting off power. This approach has continued through GridEx
V.
The public version of the GridEx III final report included two groups of
recommendations based on observations from the exercise that relates to this study. One
example recommendation focuses on information sharing in support of situational awareness
(NERC, 2016d).
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Organizations should review documentation that describes their internal
information-sharing processes in the context of a large-scale event. This will
enhance current situation awareness of staff at system operations, field locations,
security, and other business areas. Documentation should be examined to identify
opportunities to align incident response by different parts of the organization.
The right information needs to be collected and shared during a large-scale event to maintain
situational awareness, both within individual organizations and across organizations.
The second related recommendation states
Review the various tools and reporting processes used by the industry to identify
opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the information
sharing process.
There are numerous methods to share information, with some being mandatory. These
include reporting requirements to E-ISAC and the Department of Energy and within the
operations for sharing between Reliability Coordinators. Duplicate information and regulatory
requirements can slow down the reporting of initial information. These tools need to be
simplified and coordinated to ensure that the right people receive consistent information
(Diebold et al., 2013).
There is little published cybersecurity research performed on whether incident response
exercises improve an organization or industry’s ability to respond. Organizations may treat the
exercise as a minimal item to pass compliance requirements and limit participation. Resource
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constraints or a belief that the risk is low due to a belief that attackers only target larger
organizations may also limit participation (Line, Zand, Stringhini, & Kemmerer, 2014).

2.7 Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM)

Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a technique used for studying causal models
simultaneously in psychometric research. Two versions are commonly used. Both versions of
SEM are second-generation multivariate statistical analysis techniques. First-generation
techniques include exploratory tools such as cluster analysis and exploratory factor analysis and
confirmatory tools such as multiple regression and logistic regression. Second-generation tools
include covariance-based structural equation modeling (CB-SEM) and partial least squares
structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) (Joseph F. Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014; Lowry
& Gaskin, 2014).
These techniques are ideal for research where measurements cannot be directly taken but
are instead inferred from other variables. Latent variables are unmeasured variables that are
estimated using a linear combination of measured variables (Bentler & Weeks, 1980).
CB-SEM, also known as factor-based SEM, uses the maximum likelihood approach to
minimize the difference between the estimated and observed covariance matrices (Astrachan,
Patel, & Wanzenried, 2014). To do this, the variance of each measured variable includes the
common variance shared with other variables in the measurement model and the unique variance
consisting of specific variance and error (J. Hair, Hult, Ringle, Sarstedt, & Thiele, 2017).

31

PLS-SEM differs from CB-SEM in that PLS-SEM focuses on variance. A challenge of
PLS-SEM is that multicollinearity, which is expected when combining factors that are measuring
the same latent variable, tends to either overestimate or underestimate path coefficients resulting
in false or false negatives. To overcome this, the consistent PLS algorithm (PLSc) calculates the
reliability coefficient ρA and uses this value to correct for attenuation before performing ordinary
least squares. When used with normally distributed data, PLSc reduced the likelihood of falsepositive errors in exchange for an increase in the likelihood of false-negative errors (Sarstedt,
Hair, Ringle, Thiele, & Gudergan, 2016).
A study of the differences tested the typical reasons one approach was chosen over
another using Monte Carlo simulation (Reinartz, Haenlein, & Henseler, 2009). This study
identified that while PLS-SEM makes no assumptions regarding distribution, CB-SEM is also
robust to non-normal distributions. PLS-SEM does not suffer from identification and
convergence problems. However, CB-SEM only rarely suffers from these problems. PLS-SEM
is more appropriate than CB-SEM for small samples as sample populations of about 100 can
obtain a reasonable result and is often more appropriate for sample sizes of less than 250. Based
on the sample size, this study used PLS-SEM for data analysis.

2.8 Applications of PLS-SEM

PLS-SEM has been widely used in causal studies using structural equation modeling. No
studies were identified that focused on organizational preparation for a cybersecurity incident.
Incident response is a component of cybersecurity. A computer security study of behavior
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reviewed 430 university students concerning protection motivation, social bond theory,
awareness, and anti-malware protection (Berthevas, 2018). The relationship between selfassessment of controls, cloud security, and cloud-related business performance was established
using PLS-SEM (Au, Fung, & Tses, 2016). A study of 183 bank employees identified
relationships between information security awareness programs, employees’ intent for compliant
behavior, perceived level of monitoring, and actual compliant behavior (Bauer & Bernroider,
2015).
Safety and loss prevention is another related concept. One study established several
relationships between safety and health rules, safety procedures, first aid support and training,
organizational safety support, and occupational hazard prevention (Kaynak, Toklu, Elci, &
Toklu, 2016). Another safety study established relationships across eight latent variables to
identify factors influencing safe workplace behavior (Hald, 2018).
PLS-SEM has also been used to address organizational climate. A study of 264 nurses
found that factors such as autonomy and control of the work environment improved perception,
whereas burnout reduced perception and safety climate required special attention as an
opportunity to improve the environment (dos Santos Alves, da Silva, & de Brito Guirardello,
2017). A small study in Malaysia surveyed 74 people identified that management commitment,
safety training, and safety rules and procedures were related to safety behavior (Subramaniam,
Hassana, Mohd. Zin, Sri Ramalu, & Shamsudin, 2016).
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
This study evaluates a set of human factors necessary for an incident response plan in the
electric sector. A hypothesized causal model based on the literature review is tested using a set
of factors represented by latent variables and indicators. The model is analyzed using partial
least squares analysis structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM).

3.1 Summary of Selected Methodology

The process used to collect and analyze data involved multiple tools and techniques
includes the following steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Identify a proposed research model, hypotheses, and associated measured variables
Collection of data via survey instrument
Analyze collected measured data for skewness, kurtosis, and Cronbach’s alpha
Identify a causal path model using partial least squares structural equation modeling
(PLS-SEM) for model validation

Step 1 involves developing a set of measured variables and associated questions to be
analyzed by personnel with the responsibility to respond to a power grid cybersecurity incident
and operate the power grid during an incident. These variables were based on the five groups of
topics identified in the literature review. Each evaluated statement addressed a separate point
identified in the literature.
Step 2 involves promoting and circulating the questions to personnel in the electric sector
using a Likert style survey. The collected data included 29 measured variables addressing five
sets of ideas represented by latent variables documented in the literature review.
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Step 3 involves analyzing the collected survey data to identify the actual relationships
and associated factors that describe the relationships using principal component analysis. These
relationships may differ from the original proposed model.
Step 4 involves applying PLS-SEM to the collected data to verify the causal model.

3.2 Proposed Research Model and Hypotheses

This research focuses on a set of factors necessary for a successful incident response
plan. The selected factors were based on areas emphasized by the electric sector through work
by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). These areas of focus include
information sharing, situational awareness, incident response exercises, and their impact on
incident response planning.
The following hypotheses are proposed to test the structural relationships among the
model constructs.
H1: Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on
perceived situational awareness confidence.
H2: Perceived situational awareness confidence has a positive and significant effect on
the perceived incident response plan adequacy.
H3: Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on the
perceived incident response plan adequacy.
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H4: Perceived exercise response learning has a positive and significant effect on the
perceived incident response plan adequacy.
The tests for the hypotheses are performed using the structural model shown in Figure 5
using the variables shown in Table 3

SH: Information
Sharing Quality

H1

H3

SA: Situational
Awareness
Confidence

H2

PL: Incident
Response Plan
Adequacy

H4

EX: Incident
Response Exercise
Learning

Figure 5 Structural Model
Table 3 Latent Variables
Variable
EX
SH
SA
PL

Type
Exogenous Latent
Exogenous Latent
Endogenous Latent
Endogenous Latent

Description
Incident Response Exercise Learning
Information Sharing Quality
Situational Awareness Confidence
Incident Response Plan Adequacy
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The overall research model, including the identified indicators, also referred to as
measured variables, is shown in Figure 6.

3.3 Survey Instrument

A set of questions was developed and distributed to personnel in the electric sector that
would be involved in some manner during a cybersecurity incident. These surveys were
distributed to participants at various industry meetings, primarily meetings related to critical
infrastructure security, and through emails using purchased email lists.
The survey contained six sections and a total of 31 questions. The first four sections
included the factors evaluated in the model, incident response exercise learning, information
sharing quality, situational awareness confidence, and incident response plan adequacy. The
fifth section address perceived readiness for a cybersecurity incident and is not used here. The
final section collected limited demographic data.
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Figure 6 Proposed Research Model
Respondents evaluated the statement associated with each indicator variable via a Likert
scale with the range of: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, Neutral, Somewhat
Agree, Agree, and Strongly Agree. The survey was distributed via the web using Qualtrics®
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software and in paper form. The electronic survey instrument, which includes additional
questions not used in this model, is shown in Appendix 2.
There are specific regulations in NERC Reliability Standard CIP-011 (NERC, 2019c)that
requires “ procedure(s) for protecting and securely handling BES Cyber System Information,
including storage, transit, and use.” BES Cyber System Information is defined as (NERC,
2019a);
Information about the BES Cyber System that could be used to gain unauthorized access
or pose a security threat to the BES Cyber System. BES Cyber System Information does
not include individual pieces of information that by themselves do not pose a threat or
could not be used to allow unauthorized access to BES Cyber Systems, such as, but not
limited to, device names, individual IP addresses without context, ESP names, or policy
statements. Examples of BES Cyber System Information may include, but are not limited
to, security procedures or security information about BES Cyber Systems, Physical
Access Control Systems, and Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems that is not
publicly available and could be used to allow unauthorized access or unauthorized
distribution; collections of network addresses; and network topology of the BES Cyber
System.

The survey was carefully constructed not to ask questions related to BES Cyber System
Information and privately reviewed to ensure no infringement. Further, all information was
collected anonymously by the survey tool, not through de-identification, but instead by noncollection. Finally, extremely limited demographic information was collected to ensure no
potential reverse identification of respondents. Anonymity was assured in survey
announcements.
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3.4 Study Variables

3.4.1 Structural Model

Table 3 identifies four latent variables to assess the structural model. Figure 6 shows the
structural model.

3.4.2 Incident Response Exercise Learning Measurement Model

Table 4 identifies five measurements surveyed that assesses the incident response
exercise learning latent variable. Figure 7 shows the measurement model. Incident response
exercise learning is an exogenous latent variable with indicators related to this study that may be
tested during an exercise.

Figure 7 Incident Response Exercise Learning Measurement Model
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Table 4 Incident Response Exercise Learned Indicators
Indicator

Variable
Type

Dimension

EX1

Measured

Adequate Exercise
Design

Our team performs incident response exercises that test how well
information is shared between teams. (NERC, 2012, 2014,
2016d)

EX2

Measured

Lessons Learned
Captured

After an exercise, we carefully reviews and documents the
lessons learned. (NERC, 2019c)

EX3

Measured

Information
Sharing During
Exercise

Our exercises effectively test the sharing of information. (Diebold
et al., 2013; NERC, 2016d)

EX4

Measured

Exercise

Our exercise effectively test the ability of teams to develop a
shared situational awareness of events. (Kaber & Endsley, 1998;
NERC, 2016d)

(References related to the exercise statement)

Situational
Awareness
EX5

Measured

Survey Statement (1=disagree, 7=agree)

Exercise Incident
Command

Our exercises effectively exercise the incident command structure
and support staff to ensure clear responsibility and authority.
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008)

3.4.3 Information Sharing Quality Measurement Model

Table 5 identifies five measurements to survey that assesses the incident sharing quality
exercise learning latent variable. Figure 8 shows the measurement model. The measurement
objectives highlight the organization’s ability to collect and share information needed to prevent
a cybersecurity incident and respond to an incident. While the focus is on incident response,
practical use of information often requires awareness of the information before responding to an
incident.
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Figure 8 Information Sharing Quality Measurement Model
Table 5 Information Sharing Quality Indicators
Indicator Variable
Type

Dimension

Survey Statement (1=disagree, 7=agree)

SH1

Measured

External
Information
Collection

Our team gets appropriate information from industry sources
to recognize risks, threats, and vulnerabilities to our system
(Diebold et al., 2013)

SH2

Measured

External
Information
Actionability

Our team can take effective action using security information
we receive from external sources, such as E-ISAC. (Diebold et
al., 2013)

SH3

Measured

Outbound
Information
Sharing

Our team shares security information that we have with our
partners such as E-ISAC and the Reliability Coordinator
(Diebold et al., 2013)

SH4

Measured

Clear
Communication

Our team shares security information effectively between
teams and with incident response leaders in a standardized
format. (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Department of Homeland
Security, 2008)

SH5

Measured

People with
Correct Skills and
Access

Our team shares security information to the correct personnel
that can make effective use of the information. (Mateski et al.,
2012)
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3.4.4 Situational Awareness Confidence Measurement Model

Table 6 identifies five measurements to survey that assesses the situational awareness
confidence latent variable. Figure 9 shows the measurement model. The measurement
objectives highlight the ideas of Endsley’s model (2012) of situational awareness, which is based
around perception, comprehension, and projection. The indicators target a shared situation
awareness viewpoint, based on the idea that a cybersecurity incident response team and not
individuals respond to an incident.

Figure 9 Situational Awareness Confidence Measurement Model

3.4.5 Incident Response Plan Adequacy Measurement Model

Table 7 identifies six measurements to survey that assesses the situational awareness
confidence latent variable. Figure 10 shows the measurement model. The measurement
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objectives highlight that adequate skilled people, appropriate tools, and resources are necessary
to respond to an incident. Additionally, the questions address confidence in the plan to detect,
contain, and eradicate an intrusion into the network and to appropriately address various types of
events with different impacts.
Table 6 Situational Awareness Confidence Indicators
Indicator

Variable
Type

Dimension

Survey Statement (1=disagree, 7=agree)

SA1

Measured

Shared Situational
Perception

Our organization is unable to assess and understand security
issues as they happen allowing the situation to deteriorate.
(reverse encoded question) (US-Canada Power System Outage
Task Force, 2004)

SA2

Measured

Shared Situational
Comprehension

Our organization has the ability to develop a strong shared
comprehension of the situation that is free of conflicts. (Kaber
& Endsley, 1998)

SA3

Measured

Organizational
Projection

Our team would struggle to forecast what could happen next
during an incident. (reverse encoded question) (D'Amico et al.,
2005)

SA4

Measured

Situational Risk
Awareness

Our team has the appropriate skills and training to respond to
most incidents that could be identified. (Webb et al., 2014)

SA5

Measured

Organizational
Comprehension
under Stress

Our team is able to effectively communicate and receive
information from disparate sources and draw effective
conclusions during an incident. (Bigley & Roberts, 2001)

3.4.6 Summarized Survey Statements and Indicators

Table 8 presents a summarized version of the statements evaluated by respondents for
each indicator variable and the associated latent variable.
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Figure 10 Incident Response Plan Adequacy Measurement Model
Table 7 Incident Response Plan Adequacy Indicators
Indicator

Dimension

Survey Statement (1=disagree, 7=agree)

PL1

Variable
Type
Measured

Flexibility

Our team’s incident response plan is flexible and able to deal
with a wide variety of cyber-attacks. (West-Brown et al., 2003)

PL2

Measured

Processes to Detect
an Intrusion

Our team understands how it would detect an intrusion in a
timely manner when it occurs using the tools available.
(Cichonski et al., 2012)

PL3

Measured

Processes to
Contain an
Intrusion

Our team is able to detect an intrusion in a timely manner when
it occurs using the tools available. (Cichonski et al., 2012)

PL4

Measured

Process to
Eradicate an
Intrusion

Our team has planned how to eliminate an intrusion or
malware. (Cichonski et al., 2012)

PL5

Measured

Designed for
Various Event
Types/Impacts

Our team knows how to adjust and adapt plans for both small
and large scale cyber-attacks (NERC, 2019c)

PL6

Measured

Cyber Kill Chain

Our team’s incident response plan considers the various stages
of an attack from initial intrusion through the attack that could
crash the power grid. (Assante & Lee, 2015)
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3.4.7 Demographics, Information Protection, and Data Privacy
Demographic information that could be used to identify individuals or companies could
place companies at risk either through the audit processes or investigations if a cybersecurity
incident later occurs. Additionally, information such as the IP address of the respondent cannot
be maintained. While limiting certain types of analysis that could be performed, it is a necessary
limitation on the study.
Demographic data collected includes the type of company, which included investorowned utilities, public power companies, and cooperative power companies. The self-identified
role during a cybersecurity incident was also asked.

3.5 Procedures

3.5.1 Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval

The survey instrument was reviewed and determined to be exempt by the University of
Central Florida Institutional Review Board. A copy of this determination is in Appendix A. The
survey presented am All persons responding to the survey did so voluntarily.

3.5.2 Anonymity

Due to the nature of the industry, anonymity was considered a paramount priority due to
the nature of the regulations the industry operates under, specifically including reliability
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standard CIP-011-2 (NERC, 2019c) addressing Bulk Electric System Cyber System Information
(BCSI). All questions were carefully worded not to include questions related to BCSI. No
opportunity was given to provide information on the electronic survey that could disclose
anonymity.

3.5.3 Participant Recruitment

Volunteers were recruited using various methods. The recruiting approach used public
and or personal invitations at electric sector meetings, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee
Florida Reliability Coordinating Council Critical Infrastructure Protection
Subcommittee
Reliability First Infrastructure Protection Committee
NERC Grid Security Conference
Indiana Electric Cooperatives Technical Committee
Illinois Electric Cooperatives Technical Committee
NRECA TechAdvantage Conference
SANS Industrial Control Systems Conference

As many of these conferences specifically focused on power grid cybersecurity and
therefore included personnel with companies pre-disposed to good security practices, two
targeted mailing lists were used to invite additional participants. A total of 229 complete and
usable surveys were collected. Due to the method of recruitment, it is impossible to determine
an overall response rate.
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Table 8 Summarized Surveys Statement for Indicators and Latent Variables
Variable

SH1

Variable
Type
Exogenous
Latent
Measured

SH2

Measured

SH3

Measured

SH4

Measured

SH5

Measured

SA
SA1

Endogenous
Latent
Measured

SA2

Measured

SA3

Measured

SA4

Measured

SA5

Measured

EX1

Exogenous
Latent
Measured

EX2

Measured

EX3

Measured

EX4

Measured

EX5

Measured

PL
PL1

Endogenous
Latent
Measured

PL2

Measured

PL3

Measured

PL4

Measured

PL5

Measured

PL6

Measured

SH

Dimension

Survey Statement (1=disagree, 7=agree)

Information Sharing Quality
External Information
Collection
External Information
Actionability
Outbound
Information Sharing
Clear
Communication

Our team gets appropriate information from industry sources to recognize risks,
threats, and vulnerabilities to our system (Diebold et al., 2013)
Our team can take effective action using security information we receive from
external sources, such as E-ISAC. (Diebold et al., 2013)
Our team shares security information that we have with our partners such as EISAC and the Reliability Coordinator (Diebold et al., 2013)
Our team shares security information effectively between teams and with
incident response leaders in a standardized format. (Bigley & Roberts, 2001;
Department of Homeland Security, 2008)
People with Correct
Our team shares security information to the correct personnel that can make
Skills and Access
effective use of the information. (Mateski et al., 2012)
Situational Awareness Confidence
Shared Situational
Perception

Our organization is unable to assess and understand security issues as they
happen allowing the situation to deteriorate. (reverse encoded question) (USCanada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004)
Shared Situational
Our organization has the ability to develop a strong shared comprehension of the
Comprehension
situation that is free of conflicts. (Kaber & Endsley, 1998)
Organizational
Our team would struggle to forecast what could happen next during an incident.
Projection
(reverse encoded question) (D'Amico et al., 2005)
Situational Risk
Our team has the appropriate skills and training to respond to most incidents that
Awareness
could be identified. (Webb et al., 2014)
Organizational
Our team is able to effectively communicate and receive information from
Comprehension
disparate sources and draw effective conclusions during an incident. (Bigley &
under Stress
Roberts, 2001)
Incident Response Exercise Learning
Adequate Exercise
Design
Lessons Learned
Captured
Information Sharing
During Exercise
Exercise
Situational
Awareness
Exercise Incident
Command

Our team performs incident response exercises that test how well information is
shared between teams. (NERC, 2012, 2014, 2016d)
After an exercise, we carefully reviews and documents the lessons learned.
(NERC, 2019c)
Our exercises effectively test the sharing of information. (Diebold et al., 2013;
NERC, 2016d)
Our exercise effectively test the ability of teams to develop a shared situational
awareness of events. (Kaber & Endsley, 1998; NERC, 2016d)

Flexibility

Our team’s incident response plan is flexible and able to deal with a wide variety
of cyber-attacks. (West-Brown et al., 2003)
Our team understands how it would detect an intrusion in a timely manner when
it occurs using the tools available. (Cichonski et al., 2012)
Our team is able to detect an intrusion in a timely manner when it occurs using
the tools available. (Cichonski et al., 2012)
Our team has planned how to eliminate an intrusion or malware. (Cichonski et
al., 2012)
Our team knows how to adjust and adapt plans for both small and large scale
cyber-attacks (NERC, 2019c)

Our exercises effectively exercise the incident command structure and support
staff to ensure clear responsibility and authority. (Department of Homeland
Security, 2008)
Incident Response Plan Adequacy

Processes to Detect
an Intrusion
Processes to Contain
an Intrusion
Process to Eradicate
an Intrusion
Designed for
Various Event
Types/Impacts
Cyber Kill Chain

Our team’s incident response plan considers the various stages of an attack from
initial intrusion through the attack that could crash the power grid. (Assante &
Lee, 2015)
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3.5.4 Review of Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics are analyzed to determine internal consistency and normality. The
reviewed statistics include range, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and Cronbach’s
alpha. As the format of the survey is a Likert scale, it is expected the range for all variables,
excluding categorical demographic data, will be between 1-7. IBM SPSS® Version 26 is used to
perform these tests.
The means and standard deviation identify the average response and extent of deviation
of the responses assuming a normally distributed response. Skewness is a measure of symmetry
or the distortion of the data set with a value of 0, indicating the data matches a normal curve
exactly. High kurtosis indicates that the data has heavy tails, with the extreme case being a
uniform distribution. Significant skewness and kurtosis indicate the data is not normally
distributed. Skewness and kurtosis should both be less than 2.0 if the data are normally
distributed (Cameron, 2004). Normality is preferred, but not explicitly required for PLS-SEM
(Joseph F. Hair et al., 2014).
Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of internal consistency, or a measure of how consistently
individuals rate items in a scale. The data is further reviewed to consider the effect of
eliminating any single term to identify if removal of a variable increases the alpha to identify if
the responses to the statement are inconsistent with the remaining terms (Vaske, Beaman, &
Sponarski, 2017). While Cronbach’s alpha will also be calculated as part of the PLS-SEM
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analysis, it is separately performed first to ensure that the collected data is appropriate for
analysis.
Inter-item correlation is an alternative measure of internal consistency. Inter-item
correlation indicates an overall view of how well the items are correlated. inter-item correlations
above 0.4 indicate the items address the same characteristic (Gliem & Gliem, 2003).
Excessive collinearity is an additional concern. Pearson’s coefficient identifies if a linear
relationship is present between two values based on normally distributed variables (Akoglu,
2018). Values above 0.85 indicate a higher likelihood of issues related to collinearity.

3.5.5 PLS-SEM Model

SmartPLS 3 is used to identify and test the final model using PLS-SEM using the
consistent PLS model. Calculations are initially performed on the outer model using the factor
weighting scheme and then followed up with the path weighting scheme for evaluation of the
final model. Bootstrapping is used to identify statistical significance and p-values. Complete
bootstrapping with 5000 samples was selected.
The first set of targets is related to the outer measurement model. There are four sets of
tests to evaluate the model. Indicator reliability is measured using the outer loadings in the
model. Loadings need to be adequate to add value to the model. Hair et al. (2019) have identified
that loadings above 0.7 are preferred, and loadings above 0.5 are appropriate for use in the model.
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Indicator reliability is assessed using the outer loadings (indicator loadings) that represent
the simple correlations between measured variables and the associated latent variable. The
preferred minimum of 0.7 comes from the fact that a loading of 0.708 is representative of 50% of
an item’s variance (Joseph F Hair, Risher, Sarstedt, & Ringle, 2019). However, it is common to
find a few outer loadings in a measurement model to be less than 0.7. Indicators with loadings
less than 0.4 should be dropped (Hulland, 1999).
Three different measures are commonly used to measure internal consistency (Joseph F
Hair et al., 2019). Each of these are related and has targets between 0.7 and 0.9, with values
above 0.95 considered representative of redundant items. Cronbach’s alpha is considered a
conservative measure of reliability, whereas composite reliability (Jöreskog, 1971) is considered
a liberal measure of reliability. The difference is that composite reliability is weighted based on
the indicator’s loadings. The ρA measure (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015)is used as a compromise
between Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).
Convergent validity is measured using the average variance extracted (AVE). An
acceptable AVE is considered 0.5, indicating that at least half of the variance in the items is
explained (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019). These assessments are summarized in Table 9.
The second set of assessments relates to the structural model include collinearity, model
fit, effect size, and the statistical significance of the path coefficients.
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Table 9 Summary of the Measurement Model Validity Assessments

Indicator
reliability
Internal
consistency
Convergent
validity
Discriminant
validity

Measurement

Target

Outer loadings

> 0.7 Preferred
> 0.5 Acceptable
0.7 – 0.9
0.7 – 0.9
0.7 – 0.9
> 0.5

Cronbach’s alpha
ρA
Composite reliability
Average variance
extracted (AVE)
Heterotrait-monotrait
ratio (HTMT)

< 0.85 Preferred
0.85 - 0.90 Acceptable

Supporting
Literature
Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)

Collinearity is present when the predictor variables are correlated and can bias model
results and is measured using variance inflation factors (VIF). Values above 5.0 indicate
collinearity issues, and values between 3.0 and 5.0 indicate concern. Ideally, values should be
below or at least near 3.0 (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).
For model fit, the coefficient of determination or R2 for endogenous variables should
have values of at least 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25, which are considered substantial, moderate, and
weak while an R2 value (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019). R2 greater than 0.9 indicates an overfit that
includes noise in the model. For this model, the incident response plan adequacy has a strong
coefficient of determination, while situational awareness confidence has a moderate coefficient
of determination.
Model fit in covariance-based SEM is often analyzed using the standardized root mean
square error (SRMR), which measures the Euclidean distance between the empirical correlation
matrix and the model implied matrix model implied. Hu and Bentler (1999) defined a cutoff of
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0.8 for covariance-based SEM models. No defined value is widely accepted, though the
acceptable value for PLS-SEM would likely be higher than 0.8. (Joseph F. Hair et al., 2014)
Another journal article takes the position that a cutoff value of 0.08 is considered reasonable
(Henseler, Hubona, & Ray, 2016). For this analysis, an SRMR will be reported, but no
applicable target value will be applied.
Cohen (1988) identified the f2 statistic to measure effect sizes with at least 0.02 for a
small effect, 0.15 for a medium effect, and 0.35 for a large effect.
The capability of model prediction can be evaluated using the blindfolding procedure.
Stone-Geisser’s Q2 criterion evaluates the capability of the model to predict endogenous latent
variables. Q2 values greater than zero indicates predictive value for the model path, while values
of less than zero indicate the path does not have predictive value.
Table 10 summarizes the assessment parameters for the structural model validity
assessments.
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Table 10 Summary of the Structural Model Validity Assessments

Collinearity

Model fit

Measurement

Target

Variance
inflation factor
(VIF)
R2

< 3 Preferred
3 – 5 Acceptable

SRMR

> 0.90 Overfit
> 0.75 Substantial
> 0.50 Moderate
> 0.25 Weak
<0.08 Preferred

Effect size

f2

Path Coefficient for
direct and indirect
effects
Model Prediction
Capability

p-value

> 0.02 Small
> 0.15 Medium
> 0.35 Large
< 0.05

Q2

>0

Supporting
Literature
Hair et al. (2019)

Hair et al. (2019)

Henseler, Hubona,
& Ray (2016)
Cohen (1988)

Hair et al. (2019);
Hulland (1999)
Hair, Ringle, &
Sarstedt (2011);
Shanmugapriya &
Subramanian (2016)
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS
4.1 Introduction

Research findings include the responses, demographics, data, and associated descriptive
statistical results from the survey are reported. Path analysis using partial least squares analysis
is used, which bases estimates on explaining the maximum amount of variance.

4.2 Survey Results

Respondents evaluated the 21 survey statements previously shown in Table 8 on a sevenpoint Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) through neutral (4) to strongly agree (7).
Two questions were reverse encoded in the language, and those responses were inverted after
data collection. Each of these statements was treated as measured variables and associated with
a hypothesized latent variable. The survey also included eight additional statements related to
perceived organizational readiness, but those statements are not used in this analysis.
Data were filtered using three factors to remove any unengaged responses using three
techniques. First, at least 28 of the original 29 survey statements needed to be evaluated and
responses. Second, rejected responses included those with a standard deviation across all
evaluated statements of less than 0.4 either before or after inverting the reverse encoded
questions. Third, data excluded cases where the respondent did not recognize that the reverse
encoded questions. As shown in Table 11, 229 surveys are used in the analysis. Six respondents
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that omitted evaluating one statement had the omitted response imputed by inspection of the
associated evaluated statements.
Table 11 Survey Responses

Web-based responses during e-mail campaign

41

Other electronic responses

202

Paper responses

20

Total surveys received

263

Abandoned surveys with at least one and less than 28 of 29 statements
evaluated (all discarded surveys had 24 or fewer responses)
All 29 statements evaluated

32
231

Non-engaged responses (standard deviation < 0.4) or clearly did not recognize
reverse encoded questions

8

28 statements evaluated with one imputed response

6

Surveys analyzed in the study

229

A portion of the emails sent during the email campaign used a targeted mailing service
provided by a media company that provided response rate information. They reported that 5.7%
of emails were opened, and the survey link was clicked on in 0.4% of email messages. Overall,
64 surveys were opened and started resulting in 41 surveys completed during the email
campaign.
Demographic questions included asking the role in the company and whether the
company was an investor-owned utility, municipal utility, or cooperative. As can be seen in
Tables 12 and 13, responses from electric cooperatives are over-represented in the responses, and
personnel that directly operated the power grid is under-represented.
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Table 12 Role Played in Incident Response
Role
Power Grid Manager
Power Grid Operator
Cyber Incident Response Manager
Cyber Incident Responder
Overall Management
Other
No response

Respondents
12
10
33
40
73
59
2

Table 13 Type of Company
Type of Company
Investor owner utility
Electric cooperative
Municipal or other government electric power company
No Response

Respondents
55
126
42
6

Many of the surveys were completed during industry events such as conferences and
meetings. To ensure anonymity was maintained, no records were kept of specific invitations.
Some invitations were general announcements, and others were direct invitations.
While it is not possible to fully characterize a typical respondent that completed the
survey at an industry event, it is possible to draw some summary conclusions about those that
participated. The groups of participants can be divided into two types. There are two typical
participant type. These descriptions are clearly generalizations based on the observation of
participants in meetings.
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The first group are those that participated at NERC and other large meetings. These
participants may have from all regions of mainland United States and the Provinces of Canada,
but do not typically include representatives of Baja California, the Territories of Canada, or the
U.S. Territories. Respondents are more likely to be male. They typically included motivated
personnel with responsibility either for cybersecurity or regulatory compliance. In general,
respondents are likely to at least ten years of professional and management experience and
predominantly male.
Participation at other meetings were predominantly from a single type of company or
region of the country. They were more likely to be individual contributors, though managers
would be represented as well. They likely had at least five years of experience, more likely to be
technically focused and more likely male.
While survey participation was clearly not viral, it is known that invitations were passed
along by others to members of the Canadian Electricity Association, and at least four cooperative
associations, and at least two NERC regions. At least one vendor in the industry also shared
invitations with their customers.

4.3 Descriptive Statistics - Normality, Internal Consistency, and Collinearity

Normality is measured using skewness and kurtosis. All variables are normally
distributed, with absolute values less than 2.0 (Cameron, 2004), as shown in Table 14.
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Cronbach’s alpha is a test of internal consistency that measures if the respondents as a
group responded consistently (Vaske et al., 2017), as shown in Table 14. Values above 0.7
demonstrate internal consistency, while values above 0.9 indicate potential collinearity due to
redundancy (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019). Both incident response plan adequacy and incident
response exercise lessons learned have values above 0.9. Cronbach’s alpha concerns will be
addressed during model evaluation by removing indicator variables.
Inter-item correlations, another test of internal consistency, indicates that the items
address the same characteristic with all values above the 0.4 minimum (Gliem & Gliem, 2003).
Table 14 Descriptive Statistics

EX1
EX2
EX3
EX4
EX5
SH1
SH2
SH3
SH4
SH5
SA1
SA2
SA3
SA4
SA5
PL1
PL2
PL3
PL4
PL5
PL6

Range
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
2-7
1-7
1-7

Mean
5.15
5.34
4.76
4.79
4.82
5.29
5.14
4.72
4.31
5.20
5.28
4.80
4.58
5.24
5.08
5.19
5.25
5.27
5.36
4.97
4.68

Cronbach’s
Mean
Standard
Cronbach’s alpha with item inter-item
deviation Skewness Kurtosis
alpha
excluded
correlation
1.594
-0.935
-0.127
0.910
1.597
-1.080
0.323
0.900
1.587
-0.555
-0.639
0.921
0.890
0.701
1.621
-0.598
-0.642
0.896
1.697
-0.593
-0.705
0.919
1.495
-1.131
0.721
0.809
1.507
-0.589
-0.453
0.781
1.626
-0.744
-0.263
0.838
0.813
0.510
1.593
-0.419
-0.793
0.804
1.442
-0.968
0.534
0.818
1.481
-0.899
-0.198
0.795
1.295
-0.620
0.120
0.785
1.495
-0.289
-0.792
0.820
0.791
0.481
1.414
-0.968
0.535
0.773
1.283
-0.960
0.763
0.780
1.467
-0.934
0.324
0.884
1.319
-1.127
1.160
0.886
1.365
-1.014
0.500
0.883
0.904
0.614
1.396
-1.079
0.583
0.887
1.360
-0.983
0.660
0.883
1.549
-0.726
-0.250
0.896
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Pearson’s coefficients for all measured variables in each of the hypothesized latent
variables have a significant p-value of 0.000, indicating correlation is present. Pearson’s
coefficient identifies if a linear relationship is present between two values for normally
distributed variables (Akoglu, 2018). The bivariate Pearson’s coefficient for each group of
variables is shown in Tables 15-18, demonstrating that a linear relationship is present for all
variables in each latent variable.
Table 15 Pearson's Correlation for Incident Response Exercise Learning

Adequate Exercise Design
(EX1)
Lessons Learned Captured
(EX2)
Exercise Information Sharing
(EX3)
Exercise Situational
Awareness (EX4)
Exercise Incident Command
(EX5)

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

EX1
1
0.736
0.000
0.791
0.000
0.628
0.000
0.554
0.000

EX2

EX3

EX4

EX5

1
0.779
0.000
0.713
0.000
0.621
0.000

1
0.787
0.000
0.639
0.000

1
0.764
0.000

1

Table 16 Pearson's Correlation for Information Sharing Quality

External Information
Collection (SH1)
External Information
Actionability (SH2)
Outbound Information
Sharing (SH3)
Outbound Information
Sharing (SH3)
People with Correct Skills
and Access (SH5)

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

SH1
1
0.673
0.000
0.442
0.000
0.426
0.000
0.468
0.000
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SH2

SH3

SH4

SH5

1
0.553
0.000
0.556
0.000
0.478
0.000

1
0.533
0.000
0.434
0.000

1
0.533
0.000

1
0.000

Table 17 Pearson's Correlation for Situational Awareness Confidence

External Information
Collection (SA1)
Shared Situational
Comprehension (SA2)
Organizational
Projection (SA3)
Situational Risk
Awareness (SA4)
Organizational
Comprehension under
Stress (SA5)

SA1
1

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

SA2

0.440
0.000
0.503
0.000
0.479
0.000
0.399
0.000

SA3

SA4

SA5

1
0.456
0.000
0.452
0.000
0.577
0.000

1
0.486
0.000
0.418
0.000

1
0.601
0.000

1

Table 18 Pearson's Correlation for Incident Response Plan Adequacy

Flexibility (PL1)
Processes to Detect
an Intrusion (PL2)
Processes to Contain
an Intrusion (PL3)
Process to Eradicate
an Intrusion (PL4)
Designed for Various
Event Types (PL5)
Cyber Kill Chain
(PL6)

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

PL1
1
.626
0.000
.654
0.000
.628
0.000
.631
0.000
.581
0.000

PL2

PL3

PL4

PL5

PL6

1
.716
0.000
.570
0.000
.597
0.000
.567
0.000

1
.698
0.000
.601
0.000
.494
0.000

1
.624
0.000
.534
0.000

1
.686
0.000

4.4 Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) Model

The hypothesized structural causal path model was identified from the survey data
collected and is shown in Figure 11.
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1

Figure 11 Hypothesized PLS-SEM Causal Model
The associated hypotheses for the model include:
•
•
•
•

H1: Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on
perceived situational awareness confidence
H2: Perceived situational awareness confidence has a positive and significant
effect on perceived incident response plan adequacy
H3: Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on
perceived incident response plan adequacy
H4: Perceived exercise response learning has a positive and significant effect on
perceived incident response plan adequacy
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The hypothesized identified model represents two exogenous variables representing
information sharing quality (SH) and incident response exercise lessons learned (EX). The model
also includes two endogenous variables representing situational awareness confidence (SA) and
incident response plan adequacy (PL).
Thee variables were discarded during model analysis.:
•
•
•

EX3 removed to address excess collinearity and to reduce overall Cronbach’s
alpha
PL5 removed to address excess collinearity and to reduce overall Cronbach’s
alpha.
SA1 removed to address low average variance extracted

SmartPLS version 3 is used to perform the PLS analysis. The basic PLS algorithm used includes
(SmartPLS):
1.
2.
3.
4.

Outer approximation of the latent variable scores,
Estimation of the inner weights,
Inner approximation of the latent variable scores
Estimation of the outer weights

The consistent PLS (PLSc) algorithm adds a correction to address for inconsistency in
PLS estimates for reflexive variables by adding a correction for path coefficients, inter-construct
correlations, and indicator loading. The PLSc algorithm extends the base PLS algorithm by
adding additional steps (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015):
5. Estimate reliability
6. Correct for attenuation
7. Estimate consistent coefficients
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The data is analyzed using the PLSc algorithm. Where needed, bootstrapping with the complete
bootstrapping option with 1000 iterations is used to provide p-values for tests where a p-value is
needed.

4.5 Model Results

Structural equation models include two submodels, an inner structural model and an outer
measurement model. The measurement identifies the linear relationship between the measured
indicator variables and the associated latent variables. The structural model identifies the linear
relationship between endogenous and exogenous latent variables (Wong, 2013). Note that all
results shown except where noted reflect the final model, including only statistically significant
paths and indicators retained in the final model.

4.5.1 Measurement Model Analysis

The indicators being analyzed are reflexive, which was previously confirmed by
Cronbach’s alpha and mean inter-item correlation. When using reflexive variables, PLS-SEM
factors to consider include indicator reliability, internal consistency, convergent validity, and
discriminant validity (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).
Indicator reliability is assessed using the outer loadings (indicator loadings) that represent
the simple correlations between measured variables and the associated latent variable. The
preferred minimum is 0.7. However, it is common to find a few outer loadings in a measurement
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model to be less than 0.7. Indicators with loadings less than 0.4 should be dropped (Hulland,
1999). Table 19 shows the outer loadings with 13 measured variables having a loading above
0.7, and the remaining five measured variables have a loading above 0.6.
Three related calculations measure internal consistency and reliability, including
Cronbach’s alpha, ρA, and composite reliability, with targets between 0.7 and 0.9 with values
above 0.95 indicative of redundant items (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019). Cronbach’s alpha is
considered a conservative measure of reliability, whereas composite reliability (Jöreskog, 1971)
is considered a liberal measure of reliability. The ρA measure used to adjust results in the
consistent PLS algorithm (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015) compromises between Cronbach’s alpha
and composite reliability (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019). All variables have values for each of these
measures between 0.7 and 0.9, as shown in Table 20.
Convergent validity is measured using the average variance extracted (AVE). An
acceptable AVE is considered 0.5, indicating that at least half of the variance in the items is
explained (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019). The average variance is at or above 0.5 for all variables.
The results for internal consistency and convergent validity are shown in Table 20.
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Table 19 Outer loadings of the Measured Variables on the Latent Variables
Endogenous
Variable
Information Sharing
Quality
(SH)

Exogenous
Variable
External Information Collection (SA1)
External Information Actionability (SH2)
Outbound Information Sharing (SH3)
Clear Communication (SH4)
People with Correct Skills and Access (SH5)

Outer
Loading
0.654
0.678
0.666
0.724
0.825

Situational
Awareness
Confidence
(SA)

Shared Situational Perception (SA1)
Shared Situational Comprehension (SA2)
Organizational Projection (SA3)
Situational Risk Awareness (SA4)
Organizational Comprehension under Stress (SA5)

Discarded
0.641
0.630
0.757
0.797

Incident Response
Exercise Learning
(EX)

Adequate Exercise Design (EX1)
Lessons Learned Captured (EX2)
Exercise Information Sharing (EX3)
Exercise Situational Awareness (EX4)
Exercise Incident Command (EX5)

0.822
0.766
Discarded
0.856
0.825

Incident Response
Plan Adequacy
(PL)

Flexibility (PL1)
Processes to Detect an Intrusion (PL2)
Processes to Contain an Intrusion (PL3)
Process to Eradicate an Intrusion (PL4)
Designed for Various Event Types/Impacts (PL5)
Cyber Kill Chain (PL6)

0.840
0.744
0.741
0.776
Discarded
0.786

Table 20 Internal Reliability and Convergent Validity Statistics

Incident Response Exercise Learning
Information Sharing Quality
Situational Awareness Confidence
Incident Response Plan Adequacy

Cronbach's
Alpha
0.890
0.839
0.799
0.885

rho_A
0.891
0.842
0.809
0.886
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Composite
Reliability
0.890
0.836
0.801
0.885

Average Variance
Extracted (AVE)
0.669
0.507
0.504
0.606

Discriminant validity is assessed using the heterotrait-monotrait ratio. Values above either 0.85
for more distinct measures or 0.90 for less distinct measures are suggested as limits. As this is a
theoretical model using related reflexive factors, 0.9 would be considered a targeted limit
acceptable, and 0.85 is the preferred limit. All values are below 0.85. A summary of these
targeted values and values for the structural model addressed next is shown in Table 21.
Table 21 Discriminant Validity HTMT Ratios

Information Sharing Quality
Situational Awareness Confidence
Incident Response Plan Adequacy

Incident
Response
Exercise
Learning
0.709
0.646
0.726

Information
Sharing
Quality

Situational
Awareness
Confidence

0.804
0.767

0.832

4.5.2 Structural Model Analysis

Items to assess in the structural model include collinearity, model fit, effect size, and the
statistical significance of the path coefficients. Collinearity is present when the predictor
variables are correlated and can bias model results and is measured using variance inflation
factors (VIF). Values above 5.0 indicate collinearity issues, and values between 3.0 and 5.0
indicate concern (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019). Table 22 shows that one measurement model
variable, EX4, has a VIF value of 3.15, with the remaining values below 3.0. Table 23 shows
that all structural model VIF values are below 3.0.
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Table 22 Measurement Model Collinearity Tests using VIF

External Information Collection (SA1)
External Information Actionability (SH2)
Outbound Information Sharing (SH3)
Clear Communication (SH4)
People with Correct Skills and Access (SH5)

VIF
1.934
2.349
1.647
1.800
1.585

Shared Situational Comprehension (SA2)
Organizational Projection (SA3)
Situational Risk Awareness (SA4)
Organizational Comprehension under Stress (SA5)

1.646
1.446
1.756
1.923

Adequate Exercise Design (EX1)
Lessons Learned Captured (EX2)
Exercise Situational Awareness (EX4)
Exercise Incident Command (EX5)

2.303
2.858
3.150
2.481

Flexibility (PL1)
Processes to Detect an Intrusion (PL2)
Processes to Contain an Intrusion (PL3)
Process to Eradicate an Intrusion (PL4)
Cyber Kill Chain (PL6)

2.253
2.422
2.887
2.262
1.752

Table 23 Structural Model Collinearity Tests using VIF
Situational
Awareness
Confidence
Incident Response Plan Adequacy
Information Sharing Quality
Situational Awareness Confidence

Incident Response
Plan Adequacy
1.732

1.000
1.732

For model fit, the coefficient of determination or R2 for endogenous variables should
have values of at least 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25, which are considered substantial, moderate, and
weak while an R2 value (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019). R2 greater than 0.9 indicates an overfit that
includes noise in the model. For this model, the incident response plan adequacy has a
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substantial coefficient of determination, while situational awareness confidence has a moderate
coefficient of determination, as shown in Table 24. Model fit may also be analyzed using the
standardized root mean square error (SRMR), which measures the Euclidean distance between
the empirical correlation matrix and the model implied matrix model implied. While no cutoff A
cutoff value of 0.08 is considered reasonable (Henseler et al., 2016). The estimated model had
an SRMR of 0.061.
Table 24 Coefficient of Determination for Endogenous Variables
R2
0.754
0.653

Incident Response Plan Adequacy
Situational Awareness Confidence

R2 Adjusted
0.752
0.652

The effect size is measured using the f2 statistic. Cohen (1988) identified effect sizes for
the f2 statistic of at least 0.02 for a small effect, 0.15 for a medium effect, and 0.35 for a large
effect. Incident response exercise lessons learned to incident response plan adequacy has a
medium effect. Table 25 shows that incident response exercise lessons learned to incident
response plan adequacy has a medium effect, and information sharing quality to situational
awareness and situational awareness to incident response plan adequacy each has a large effect.
Table 25 Effect Size for Model Paths

Incident Response Exercise Learning → Incident Response Plan Adequacy
Information Sharing Quality → Situational Awareness Confidence
Situational Awareness Confidence → Incident Response Plan Adequacy
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f2
0.247
1.883
0.907

Once the model is developed, the capability of model prediction can be evaluated using
the blindfolding procedure. Stone-Geisser’s Q2 criterion evaluates the capability of the model to
predict endogenous latent variables. Q2 values greater than zero indicates predictive value for
the model path, while values of less than zero indicate the path does not have predictive value.
Incident response planning has a Q2 value of 0.378, and situational awareness confidence has a
Q2 value of 0.267, indicating that the exogenous variables have predictive relevance on the
associated endogenous variables. For PLS-SEM, the cross-validated redundancy approach to
measuring the Q2 value for each of the endogenous variables is used (Joe F Hair, Ringle, &
Sarstedt, 2011; Shanmugapriya & Subramanian, 2016).

4.5.3 Hypothesis Testing

The selected causal model meets are validity assessments for both the measurement model and
the structural model, as shown in Tables 26-27. All assessments are acceptable.
Table 26 Summary of the Measurement Assessment Results

Indicator
reliability
Internal
consistency

Measurement

Target

Model results

Outer loadings

> 0.7 Preferred
> 0.5 Acceptable
0.7 – 0.9
0.7 – 0.9
0.7 – 0.9

13 variables preferred
5 variables acceptable
All variables in range
All variables in range
All variables in range

> 0.5

All variables in range

Hair et al. (2019)

< 0.85 Preferred
0.85 - 0.90
Acceptable

All variables
preferred

Hair et al. (2019)

Cronbach’s alpha
ρA
Composite
reliability
Convergent
Average variance
validity
extracted (AVE)
Discriminant Heterotraitvalidity
monotrait ratio
(HTMT)
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Supporting
Literature
Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)

Table 27 Summary of the Structural Model Assessment Results
Measurement
Collinearity

Target

Model results

Variance inflation < 3 Preferred
factor (VIF)
3 – 5 Acceptable
R2
> 0.90 Overfit
> 0.75 Substantial
> 0.50 Moderate
> 0.25 Weak
SRMR
<0.08 Preferred

17 variables preferred
1 variable acceptable
No variables overfit
1 variable substantial
1 variable moderate
No variables weak
0.061

Effect size

f2

Path Coefficient
for direct and
indirect effects
Model
Prediction
Capability

p-value

> 0.02 Small
> 0.15 Medium
> 0.35 Large
< 0.05

Q2

>0

None
1 in range
2 in range
All coefficients in
range
(all variables ≤ 0.001)
All endogenous
variables above 0

Model fit

Supporting
Literature
Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)

Henseler, Hubona,
& Ray (2016);
Hair et al. (2019)
Cohen (1988)

Hair et al. (2019);
Hulland (1999)
Hair, Ringle, &
Sarstedt (2011);
Shanmugapriya &
Subramanian (2016)

The overall objective of this approach is to identify a significant set of paths in a causal model
that addresses an incident response plan's adequacy. The structural model with results shown in
Table 26 is significant, with P-values of 0.001 or less for both direct and indirect effects.
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Table 28 Causal Model Path Coefficients and Hypothesis Testing

H1

Hypothesized Path
Information Sharing Quality
→ Situational Awareness Confidence

Original
Sample
0.808

Sample
Mean
0.808

Standard
Deviation
0.052

T statistic
15.505

P-Value
0.000

H2

Situational Awareness Confidence
→ Incident Response Plan Adequacy

0.622

0.626

0.100

6.247

0.000

H3

Information Sharing Quality
→ Incident Response Plan Adequacy

0.547

0.568

0.167

0.754

0.451

H4

Incident Response Exercise Learning
→ Incident Response Plan Adequacy

0.324

0.319

0.099

3.271

0.001

Results shown for H1, H2, and H4 are calculated after removal of H3 from model

Hypothesis testing for the model is shown in Table 29. The final model is shown in Figure 12.
Table 29 Hypothesis Testing Results
Hypothesis

Result

H1

Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on
perceived situational awareness confidence

Accepted

H2

Perceived situational awareness confidence has a positive and significant effect
on perceived incident response plan adequacy

Accepted

H3

Perceived information sharing quality has a positive and significant effect on
perceived incident response plan adequacy

Rejected

H4

Perceived exercise response learning has a positive and significant effect on
perceived incident response plan adequacy

Accepted
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External
Information
Collection
External
Information
Actionability
External
Information
Actionability
Clear
Communication

0.654

R =0.653

0.678
0.666

Information
Sharing Quality

0.808**

Situational
Awareness
Confidence

0.724

0.630

0.757

0.622**

Adequate Exercise
Design

0.766
0.856

0.744
Incident
Response
Exercise Learning

0.324**

Incident
Response Plan
Adequacy

0.741
0.776

0.825

2

R =0.754

Exercise Incident
Command

Organizational
Projection
Situational Risk
Awareness
Organizational
Comprehension
under Stress

Flexibility

0.840

0.822

Exercise
Situational
Awareness

0.641

0.797

0.825

People with Correct
Skills and Access

Lessons Learned
Captured

Shared Situational
Comprehension

2

0.786

Processes to Detect
an Intrusion
Processes to
Contain an Intrusion
Process to Eradicate
an Intrusion

Cyber Kill Chain

**p 0.001

Figure 12 PLS-SEM Causal Model

4.5.4 Importance Performance Map Analysis (IMPA)

With a demonstrated model, additional analysis can be performed to identify improvement
opportunities. Importance-performance map analysis is an analytical technique that identifies
where to focus future work to gain the most improvement in the target latent variable. IPMA is
used to identify predecessors that have a low performance but high importance. A one-unit point
Increasing the performance of the predecessor by 1 point increases the performance of target by
the total effect size of the predecessor (Farooq, Salam, Fayolle, Jaafar, & Ayupp, 2018; Ringle &
Sarstedt, 2016). In this case, improvements to incident response plan adequacy would likely be
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the targeted improvement. SmartPLS reports performance in a standardized manner on the Yaxis and the total effect size of a 1-point increase on the X-axis. As can be seen from Figure 13
and Table 30, the most valuable area to focus on to improve incident response plan adequacy is
situational awareness confidence. Increasing the overall situational awareness confidence score
by 1 point would increase the incident response plan adequacy by 0.542 points.
In addition to reviewing the map at the latent variable, the impact of measured variables
can also be mapped. These results for the most important latent variable, situational awareness,
are also reported in Table 31. Within situational awareness confidence, variable SA5
representing organizational comprehension under stress has the most impact, with each 1-point
increase in the measured variable increasing perceived incident response plan adequacy by 0.16
points.

Incident
Response
Exercise
Learning

Information
Sharing
Qualiy

Situational
Awareness
Confidence

Figure 13 Importance Performance Map for Incident Response Plan Adequacy
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Table 30 Importance Performance Results for the Latent Variables
Importance
(Total Effects)
0.310
0.542
0.334

Latent Variable
Incident Response Exercise Learning
Situational Awareness Confidence
Information Sharing Quality

Performance
67.177
65.816
66.122

Table 31 Importance Performance Results for Situational Awareness Confidence
Importance
(Total Effects)
Shared Situational Comprehension (SA2)
Organizational Projection (SA3)
Situational Risk Awareness (SA4)
Organizational Comprehension under Stress (SA5)
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Importance
(Total Effects)
0.118
0.138
0.160
0.067

Performance
59.68
70.670
68.049
71.543

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
This research focused on finding a causal path model to understand the relationships
between perceived readiness for a cybersecurity incident considering the adequacy of the
incident response plan; incident response exercises such as the national GridEx; the perceived
quality of information sharing within the electric sector related to cybersecurity risks; and the
perceived confidence of situational awareness that would be gained during an incident. This
section discusses what can be learned from these results, the implications of the study, and
recommendations for future research.

5.1 Discussion

The industry focuses on cybersecurity to ensure grid reliability and resiliency. The
electric sector has numerous teams that actively perform research and education, including the
NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee, the Electric Power Research Institute,
private organizations such as the SANS Industrial Control Systems team, and the Department of
Energy National Labs. While extensive research is performed on cybersecurity, no similar study
was identified to review how the industry personnel perceive incident response plans.
This study identified that personnel in the electric sector perceive that information
sharing quality has a statistically significant causal impact on situational awareness confidence
and situational awareness has a significant impact on incident response plan adequacy for
cybersecurity incidents in the electric sector. Further, learning from incident response exercises
has a significant effect on incident response planning.
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These findings demonstrate that the efforts to improve information sharing and
situational awareness by the electric sector have been beneficial. These efforts should continue
to be enhanced by the electric sector and by other critical infrastructure information sharing and
analysis centers. These additional efforts should target improving the situational risk confidence
of personnel, especially in the area of situational risk assessment.
The study also verifies that incident response exercises such as GridEx are perceived to
improve incident response planning. The exercise requires tremendous effort within NERC, EISAC, and electric sector companies. Based on the increasing participation in exercises, the
industry recognizes the benefits(NERC, 2012, 2014, 2016d, 2018a).

5.1.1 Information Must Be in Context to Be Useful

A direct path from information sharing to incident response planning was hypothesized as
so much emphasis is placed on information sharing in the industry. In retrospect, the nonsignificance of this path and instead significance of the indirect path through situational
awareness is satisfying. Information is critical, but it does not improve the incident response
planning process. Instead, it is the ability to analyze and place the information in context that
matters. Blindly reacting to information without this context and an understanding of its
importance can lead to suboptimal real-time decisions.
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5.1.2 Low Response Rates

It is difficult to obtain responses to this type of survey due to real and perceived
limitations on responding to a survey that addresses cybersecurity. Controlling information is
essential as reconnaissance is the first step in any attack. Each piece of information publicly
available that shows a weakness guides the attackers. This survey was carefully constructed to
not infringe on the regulatory requirements. The methods used to recruit volunteers resulted in
an overrepresentation of cooperatives.
One topic of this research is information sharing. However, one challenge of this survey
was an unwillingness to participate in the survey. Response rates were extremely low for
emailed surveys, about 0.3%, requiring the use of direct recruitment. As personal interviews
were not a survey technique and those that declined never agreed to participate, no records were
kept. From an anecdotal viewpoint, one reason people declined to participate was that they were
not authorized to discuss anything that may disclose security vulnerabilities.
The target audience of the survey and the difficulty in obtaining responses resulted in
overall low variance in the data collected, confounding the results of the survey. This can be
seen in the low standard deviation of responses in Table 14, Descriptive Statistics, and also in the
high internal reliability for each latent variable in Table 20, Internal Reliability, and Converging
Validity Statistics. This low variance may be a result of consistent shared views on the topics by
those participating in the survey. Alternatively, it may have resulted from respondents believing
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they must respond a certain way should the information ever become public, or they may
experience career issues. These are just two possible causes for the consistent viewpoints.

5.1.3 Information Sharing: Public Good vs. Public Right to Know

The industry writes and enforces the Reliability Standards for the bulk power system, and
the regulations are generally approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. In
February 2018, NERC issued a $2.7 million penalty (NERC, 2018b) for a significant violation of
the information protection requirement against Pacific Gas and Electric (Smith, 2019) under a
prior version of Reliability Standard CIP-003 (NERC, 2019c). Typically, the company names of
violators are not released as part of the penalty notice by NERC or FERC. In this case, the
company was identified by journalists.
This balance of public good, denying critical information to attackers, industry learning
from violations, and the public right to know needs to be considered. This obligation needs to be
considered by both government agencies and the power grid companies. FERC Commissioner
Glick in a statement summarized some of the factors needing to be balanced (Glick, 2019)
•
•
•

Lack of transparency in the NERC Notice of Penalty process
Disclosure of company names would act as a further deterrent to violations
Need to ensure that information useful to an attacker is not released

While the company name has previously not been identified, the specific violations were
identified. Companies may, and from personal observation, frequently use this information to
improve their programs. A joint FERC and NERC white paper in response to this review would
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eliminate detailed violation information and replace this information with the name of the
violator, the penalty amount, and the NERC CIP Reliability Standards violated. The specific
requirements in Standards would not be released. Otherwise, the attackers would know specific
weaknesses to exploit.

5.1.4 Benefits of Confidential Information Sharing

While it is critical for power grid companies not to disclose vulnerabilities, the sharing of
information allows all companies to work together to improve security and, therefore electric
reliability. This ability to share makes it possible for the industry as a whole to improve
capabilities. Other industries have seen similar successes related to safety. NASA, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, through its Aviation Safety Reporting System, provides
confidential reporting and enforcement immunity to those that report incidents (NASA, 2011).
Factors in the success of the system include trust, anonymity, and confidentiality. The
information collected is used to identify and address safety issues (O'Leary & Chappell, 1996).
This system is highly successful, with 94,302 reports received in 2017 (Hooey, 2018). By
providing immunity, confidentiality, and trust to controllers, pilots, and companies for
information reported, NASA has created a system that encourages reporting of events and
therefore increases safety.
Other industries have various reporting systems that have enhanced safety. The
MedWatch Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting System performs this role in the
health care sector. The voluntary information from the public and mandatory information from
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manufacturers provides a basis for identifying safety risks from products (Craigle, 2007; Han,
Ball, Pamer, Altman, & Proestel, 2017). Ahmad (2003) demonstrates the success of the program
by listing a dozen different regulatory actions taken by the Food and Drug Administration.
The electric sector collects some of this information through the Electricity Information
Sharing and Analysis Center using their private portal. However, personal observation is that
only a limited amount of voluntary information gets reported. To make the best use of this tool,
increasing the amount of information and useful tools to automate the analysis of information
once adequate information is available will improve electric sector capabilities. For
electronically collected data, this task is currently performed using the Cybersecurity Risk
Information Sharing Program (CRISP), where suitable information is available to analyze.
Department of Energy specialists perform this analysis (Department of Energy, 2018). Increased
speed identifying events is critical. Just as important is identifying risks to the power grid. The
lack of information sharing due to fears of risks becoming public both impedes attackers and the
companies.

5.1.5 Lack of History for Cyberattacks with Power Outages

Cyberattacks are frequent in information technology, including the business side of the
electric companies. Ransomware has been the prevalent high-profile attack in 2017-2019. In
2019, more than 70 cities have suffered from ransomware (Brumfield, 2019). Utilities have been
targeted as well, with one ransomware attack in Johannesburg disrupting the ability for residents
to pre-purchase power (Cimpanu, 2019; Manos, 2017; Walton, 2018). However, there have only
81

been two attacks that have disrupted the power grid, with both occurring in Ukraine (Assante et
al., 2016; Assante et al., 2017). The respondents to the survey were communicating their beliefs
for a potential power grid cyberattack, not an actual cyberattack.
So far, cyberattacks on the power grid have been high-impact low-frequency events.
NERC and the Department of Energy studied three types of these events: coordinated cyber and
physical attack, pandemic illness, and geomagnetic and electromagnetic events while
acknowledging there are others such as natural disasters, meteor strikes, and war (North
American Electric Reliability Corporation & Department of Energy, 2010). Since experience is
limited or non-existent in the current environment, other techniques are required. The most
damaging effect would be a complete collapse of the power grid.
One study technique focuses on identifying different scenarios that could cause a
collapse, hardening those weak points, and taking steps to mitigate these risks. For example, a
physical attack on as few as nine strategically placed substations could collapse the power grid
under the right circumstances (Tweed, 2014). An additional reliability standard, CIP-014, was
added to address this risk (NERC, 2019c). Geomagnetic storms require different types of
protections for the power grid, but also focus on vulnerabilities and weak points. The biggest
mitigation for both of these events is engineering resilience into the system. Additional power
grid resilience contains the impact of an event. Reducing this impact simplifies response and
recovery.
Systems and technology are not the only risk. This study focused on people. A severe
curtailment of people and resources, such as a pandemic event, would challenge the electric
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sector. The power grid depends on a large number of people with specialized skill sets such as
power engineers, linemen, and system operators. It is incumbent on electric utilities to
understand who the most critical staff are and ensure they and their families get the most
protection. People will place family before the power grid.
Further, cyberattacks take advantage of opportunity due to loss of response capability.
The simplest example is the increase in fraudulent fund-raising emails following an event such as
a hurricane. In the power grid, nation-states take steps to be implanted inside of other countries’
power grids should an attack be needed. These capabilities will likely remain unused unless a
specific need arises. Resilience, the ability to recover from an event, must consider people as
well as processes and technology.

5.2 Study Limitations

In addition to the low response rate previously discussed, the predominant limitation is
the homogeneity of the study. The study population was primarily collected through survey
invitations at meetings due to the low email response rate. As a result, motivated professionals,
especially managers, were the primary respondents. The sample is somewhat biased and resulted
in shared, consistent views. Homoscedasticity can lead to imprecise estimates and sensitivity to
the choice of the indicators used (Crump, Hotz, Imbens, & Mitnik, 2009). This homoscedasticity
is also seen in the Cronbach’s alpha statistics shown in Table 14, Descriptive Statistics. Shifting
this study from specific research in the electric sector to the broader group of companies that use
industrial control systems could address the low response rate and homoscedasticity.
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Restricting the sample to the electric sector and focusing so heavily on the power grid
also limits the ability to extend the results of the study to other technology sectors. However, the
electric sector is unique in the manner it chooses to respond to cybersecurity incidents. Whether
or not this uniqueness in its approach is needed can be debated. This debate will become even
more important as more sectors take a regulatory approach to information security.
Incident response is just one component of cybersecurity. The Framework for Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2018) also
addresses risk identification, system protection, attack detection, and recovery. By focusing on a
single component, the study is only applicable to incident response. Pairing these results with
additional studies that address the remaining framework domains would add context and
contribute to a fully functional method to improve cybersecurity in critical infrastructure.

5.3 Future Research

The present study researched specific areas that have been targeted by the industry for
improvement. Future work may need to address other areas such as the cybersecurity culture in
organizations and the workforce in general. Safety research has demonstrated the importance of
safety culture (Lawrie, Parker, & Hudson, 2006; Noort, Reader, Shorrock, & Kirwan, 2016;
Shirali, Shekari, & Angali, 2016). Cybersecurity culture is an extension of these well-proven
ideas (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Flores, Antonsen, & Ekstedt, 2014).
Another potential research area is to identify how incident response exercises can more
effectively build confidence for cybersecurity personnel that would be responding to a power
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grid incident. Some in the industry are of the opinion that many smaller companies see these
tabletop exercises more as a regulatory checkbox than a learning process. To effectively
exercise, these responders need to be pushed beyond the response plan and challenge their
capabilities, such as in a GridEx exercise. Through these challenges, people learn how to adapt
to the specific event, communicate effectively, and make appropriate decisions.
The recruitment methods and survey statements focused on power grid personnel that
would respond to a cybersecurity incident. While these teams focus on the technical aspects, a
similar study of system operations personnel responsible for operating the power grid could shed
insights. For example, how well do these operators have the ability to recognize a cybersecurity
and understand how an incident would affect their operations? Do they distinguish how a
cybersecurity incident is different from other significant power grid events? Do they trust their
company’s cybersecurity capabilities if an incident occurs?
While the data that was collected is inadequate to perform a multigroup analysis based on
demographics, another potential approach may be to perform predictive tree analysis. This
technique identifies individuals with similar views as clusters and analyzes the difference in the
clusters using automatic indicator detector analysis (Wan & Shasky, 2012).
While response is critical, recovery back to the normal state, or at least to a condition that
is as near normal as possible, is the end goal. A potential follow-up would be to adapt this type
of survey towards recovery and focus more on the people who would be responsible for bringing
the attacked portion of the power grid back to life. Significant work has been done related to
weather events and blackouts (Duffey & Ha, 2012; Sun, Liu, & Liu, 2011). Understanding the
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confidence that the personnel have towards power grid recovery during a cybersecurity event
could highlight additional areas of improvement. A critical aspect of this study would be the
higher distrust of information provided by control systems in a cybersecurity event than a
weather event.

5.4 Conclusion

The results of this study revealed that personnel in the electric sector believe that
information sharing quality has an impact on situational awareness confidence, and situational
awareness has an impact on incident response plan adequacy for cybersecurity incidents in the
electric sector. Further, learning from incident response exercises has an effect on incident
response planning.
These findings demonstrate that the efforts by the electric sector to enhance information
sharing and situational awareness by NERC and the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis
Center have been beneficial and that these efforts should continue to be enhanced by the electric
sector and by other critical infrastructure information sharing and analysis centers. These
additional efforts are recommended to focus on improving the situational risk confidence of
personnel and that these efforts need to focus on situational risk assessment and training.
The most important aspect of this model is that it is not limited to cyberattacks. The
framework developed tying incident response to situational awareness, information sharing, and
event exercises would be appropriate to extend to other event types and event response
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disciplines. The indicators would need to be customized to the discipline, and no preexisting
framework is available.
This study contributes to the body of knowledge by presenting a model that ties together
the human factors in power grid incident response. Through this model, the industry can identify
where and how to direct future efforts to improve people’s capabilities to respond to a
cyberattack. While the model developed focused in this limited area, the ideas are readily
extensible to other related domains.
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